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I   INTRODUCTION1 
 
In the last volume of the University of Queensland Law Journal, we began a 
reconsideration of the exclusive reservation of land conveyancing work that Queensland 
legislation provides for solicitors.2 The development of this reservation was recounted: a 
slow process that saw the admission of nonlawyer ‘certificated’ conveyancers prohibited 
from 1940; the remaining certificated conveyancers, literally, dying out in the 1980s; and 
the exclusion of barristers from conveyancing practice being formalised as late as 2004.3 
We then addressed the legal and practical scope of the reservation – noting how the 
Queensland Law Society has strongly resisted efforts by nonlawyer conveyancers from 
other Australian States to gain access to Queensland property markets, while allowing to 
real estate agents the important role of contract formation and the creation of interests 
and legal rights in land.4 Since the first article was published, a draft Legal Profession 
National Law has been prepared, but if implemented it would not affect the nature or 
scope of the solicitors’ conveyancing reservation in Queensland.5  
The implications that the Queensland solicitors’ (qualified) conveyancing 
reservation have for competition law and policy remain of concern while the National 
Competition Council disagrees with the Queensland Government’s explanations for 
prohibiting an access to nonlawyer conveyancers that other States allow.6 Having in the 
first article given the background and scope of the conveyancing reservation, we consider 
in section II of this article the competition implications of the reservation and the 
arguments for and against maintaining it. This involves, first, an analysis of 
conveyancing markets in Queensland and an assessment of the impact that competition 
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law has on them. As will be seen, it cannot be assumed that the existing barrier to entry 
must result in a lack of competition,7 or that solicitors are currently engaged in anti-
competitive conduct that lawful competition by nonlawyer conveyancers might 
overcome. Secondly, it is ultimately a question of policy whether the current ‘legal 
practice’ barrier to entry should be maintained. In accordance with current inter-
governmental agreements regarding the implementation of national competition policy, 
the barrier is only defensible if its benefits exceed its costs. Thirdly, competition-based 
reforms have already been made to the profession in the Legal Profession Acts. The 
implications these have for nonlawyer access to conveyancing markets are also 
considered.  
In light of the effect of competition law, policy and reforms that have already been 
made, we conclude in section III with suggestions as to how any lines of debate over the 
introduction of nonlawyer conveyancing in the State could be refined and whether, given 
existing reforms, there is any greater need to lower barriers to entry to conveyancing 
markets in Queensland.  
However, given the focus on competition issues in this article, it is worth reiterating 
a point made in the first article about the use of the term ‘monopoly’.8 Although this 
reservation is commonly called the solicitors’ conveyancing ‘monopoly’, in the language 
of economics, and of competition law and policy, there is no monopoly in the provision 
of conveyancing services in Queensland. A monopoly needs a single provider of services 
who controls the price at which the service is sold.9  As there are more than 1300 
solicitors’ practices in Queensland that are lawfully able to provide conveyancing 
services, the legislation more accurately creates a barrier to entering the market for 
conveyancing services. 10  The question of nonlawyer conveyancing in Queensland, 
instead of raising the question of breaking a monopoly, is therefore one of lowering a 
barrier to entry to extend the class of persons able to provide the service. 
 
 
II   COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
  
A   Competition Law and Conveyancing 
 
Throughout Australia, lawyers are currently subject to competition law. In 1995, the 
federal Competition Policy Reform Act incorporated a Competition Code as a new part of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).11 The Competition Code applies the competition 
provisions of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act (which were beforehand limited to 
corporations) to natural persons, and this is given effect in every State and Territory by 
enabling legislation. In Queensland, this is the Competition Policy Reform Act 1996 
(Qld), and it clearly covers the conduct of solicitors.12 The advent of Incorporated Legal 
Practices (ILPs), by which law can now be practised through any qualifying 
corporation,13 brings Part IV of the Trade Practices Act itself to bear on these forms of 
                                                 
7  Barriers to entry may have an effect on competition but there are many other factors or 
elements that can be in play: Corones, below n 10, 99-120. 
8  Byrne and Mortensen, above n 2, 255; and see Priestley JA in Law Society of NSW v 
Ramalca Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 34, 35.  
9  P Butt (ed), Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (3rd ed, 2004) 286.  
10  Stephen G Corones, Competition Law in Australia (4th ed, 2007) 110. 
11  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Qld) Part XIA. 
12  The Code applies in relation to persons carrying on business within the jurisdiction: 
Competition Policy Reform Act 1996 (Qld). 
13  Qld, ss 109-61. See discussion at text at below nn 97-122. 
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law practice.14 Our analysis begins with the effect that these laws have on solicitors’ 
practices, and on competition in markets for conveyancing. 
 
1   Market Definition 
 
Although the two issues are entwined, the question of market definition is generally 
a necessary preliminary step to considering that of competition.15 Markets have a number 
of elements: product or service, geographical limitations, the functional level of the 
delivery of the good or service; and the potential for change over time.16  
In the Trade Practices Act, a ‘market’ is defined as:17  
 
... a market in Australia and, when used in relation to any goods or services, includes a 
market for those goods or services and any other goods or services that are substitutable 
for, or otherwise competitive with, the first mentioned goods or services. 
 
In market definition, the first key issue is ‘substitutability’18 and this is approached 
from both the supply and the demand sides.19 It has been argued that services supplied by 
nonlawyer conveyancers may not be substitutable for those supplied by solicitors because 
of the different levels of education, skill and experience. From the perspective of 
consumer demand, however, solicitors and nonlawyer conveyancers might be seen 
simply as alternatives. For current purposes, the market is probably best described simply 
as the provision of residential conveyancing services.20 
The second and most important element of the market is clearly the question of its 
geographic boundaries. Again the substitution test is relevant.21 How far are consumers 
in any one area prepared to go to obtain this service from other suppliers? The starting 
point for conveyancing may be quite a limited geographical area. Presumably consumers 
would look first to local solicitors. Using the hypothetical monopolist test, if the only 
local solicitor raised fees by five per cent or 10 per cent, would consumers then look 
beyond their local area? If so, how far would they go?22 The boundary of their search 
gives insight into the boundary of the market.  
                                                 
14  Ie, simply because ILPs qualify as trading corporations. 
15  Corones, above n 10, 48-49. As to the relationship between market definition and market 
power see Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 
177, 187-188. 
16  Corones, above n 10, 55. Given the nature of the business the last two elements will not be 
considered given that they will add little to the market definition in this case. 
17  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s4E. 
18  Boral Besser Masonary Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374, 454. 
19  Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 199, 210. 
20  Consideration should be given to the purposive approach to market definition: Norman and 
Williams, ‘The Analysis of Market and Competition under the Trade Practices Act: Towards 
the Resolution of Some Hitherto Unresolved Issues’ (1983) 11 Australian Business Law 
Review 396, 400-401; Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1987) 
17 FCR 211, 218-219; Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 
167 CLR 177, 195. On this basis the market would need to be limited to residential 
conveyancing as this is the only potential field of competition between the two suppliers in 
this case. 
21  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s4E. 
22  Corones, above n 10, 57-61; Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd 
(1989) 167 CLR 177, 199; P Crocioni, ‘The Hypothetical Monopolist Test: What it Can and 
cannot Tell You’ (2002) 23 (7) European Competition Law Review 354; C Sweeney and DL 
Hay, ‘Quantitative Economic Evidence in Australian and New Zealand Courtrooms’ (2003) 
10 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 284, 289-293. 
248 University of Queensland Law Journal 2010 
 
 
In-depth analysis is evidently needed to assess the extent of relevant market 
boundaries throughout Queensland and, indeed, whether they stretch beyond the State 
border. In the absence of empirical analysis, evidence of the distribution of law practices 
across the State 23  and the significance of conveyancing revenue to many regional 
practices24 makes it reasonable to suggest that the market for residential conveyancing 
services is still quite localised; perhaps more markedly so in Charles Mein’s ‘interior’ – 
regional Queensland.25 Although there is no reason why a consumer could not instruct 
any solicitor in Queensland to undertake residential conveyancing for property in any 
part of the State, any evidence that is available suggests that consumers – clients – tend to 
identify with local solicitors. There would therefore be many markets operating 
throughout Queensland, with each conveyancing market centred around a different city, 
town or business hub of the district where clients can most easily talk to the solicitor or 
paralegal staff, sign documents and pay accounts.  
 
2   The Competition Code and Residential Conveyancing Markets 
 
The efforts of the Australian Institute of Conveyancers (AIC)26 at securing access 
for nonlawyer conveyancers to Queensland conveyancing markets have mainly raised the 
question of market power. That is, it is argued that solicitors can take advantage of the 
‘legal practice’ barrier to entry27 in an anti-competitive manner. Under the Competition 
Code, the relevant legal yardstick for measuring claims of this kind is section 46.  
 
A person who has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take advantage 
of that power for the purpose of: 
 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or 
any other market.28 
 
In determining whether a person has substantial power in a market, courts must 
have regard to the extent to which their conduct is constrained by the conduct of 
competitors, potential competitors, suppliers or acquirers in the market.29 
There is little doubt, regardless of how narrowly they are interpreted, that in the 
large majority of conveyancing markets in Queensland, solicitors are competing strongly 
with other solicitors when offering residential conveyancing services. In all but the 
remotest of markets, the number of law practices vying for this work means no one 
provider could ever operate in a manner unconstrained by lawyer competition. While 
there are other influential factors, such as quality of service, at least in the larger markets 
the manner in which professional fees have been struck and are advertised are further 
evidence of the strength of competition. In the Queensland Government’s own 
commissioned competition impact statement, it was accepted that there was strong 
                                                 
23  See, K McDougall and R Mortensen, ‘New South Wales and Queensland Solicitors: A 
Spatial Analysis’ (Paper delivered at National Rural Regional Law and Justice Conference, 
Warrnambool, Victoria, 2010).  
24  Law Council of Australia, Report into the Rural, Regional and Remote Areas Lawyers 
Survey, July 2009, 9-10. 
25  Byrne and Mortensen, above n 2, 258. 
26  Ibid 262-3. 
27  Ibid 264-71. 
28  Competition Code, s46. 
29  Competition Code, s46(3). 
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competition generally for conveyancing services.30 The National Competition Council 
agreed.31 
If markets for these services are defined narrowly, then the only areas where there 
may be legitimate concerns that there is inadequate competition are very remote districts 
that are served by only a small number of solicitors.32 Still, whether solicitors in remote 
areas could have substantial market power seems doubtful. The key test is one of market 
constraints:33 the extent to which the solicitors could act in an anti-competitive manner, 
without having concerns that any rival could enter the market for a reasonable period.34 
Together, solicitors’ easy mobility and the otherwise competitive nature of law practice 
mean that the potential threat of new solicitors entering the market is a significant 
countervailing power. Further, despite the tendency to instruct local solicitors, 
conveyancing markets have become more porous with the growing ease by which 
consumers can seek advice and representation beyond their immediate business district. 
This could also be a significant constraint on the acquisition of substantial market power 
by solicitors’ practices in remote areas.35 
There are other anti-competitive provisions under the Competition Code. It is 
unlikely, nevertheless, that vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing36 and resale price 
maintenance 37  would have application to solicitors in conveyancing markets. They 
generally deal with arrangements between parties on different functional levels, and this 
is not usually relevant to the provision of residential conveyancing services. However, 
anti-competitive horizontal arrangements between competitors do potentially apply. If in 
the smaller markets solicitors did try to reach agreements between themselves that 
affected competition,38 this might violate section 45.39 Any such arrangement that is an 
exclusionary provision40 or that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially reducing competition, could be challenged under present competition 
laws. 41  In particular, any arrangement to fix prices in respect of the conveyancing 
services would automatically offend the Competition Code,42 regardless of its effect on 
competition in the market.43 
As we have noted, extended empirical analysis is needed to give more precise 
definition to the boundaries of residential conveyancing markets, and the risk that any 
solicitor could acquire substantial market power, but the available evidence to this point 
does not suggest serious concerns about the competitiveness of the market. It is true that, 
in many respects, the AIC considered that the Sande 1 (on the Mutual Recognition Act) 
and the Sande 2 (on admission and the legal practice reservation) series of cases in the 
1990s were, in effect, competition claims.44 However, even if assessed in terms of the 
more general policies that motivated the AIC’s support for it, the Sande litigation was 
                                                 
30  National Competition Policy Review, Queensland’s Legal Practice Legislation (2003) 10. 
31  National Competition Council, National Competition Policy Report (2005) 13.8: available at 
<http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/AST7As-001.pdf> at 27th November 2010. 
32  McDougall and Mortensen, above n 23.  
33  Competition Code, s46(3). 
34  Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 188. 
35  In any case, nonlawyer conveyancers have indicated that it is unlikely that they would seek to 
move into remote markets: see above n 30, 10. 
36  Competition Code, s47. 
37  Competition Code, s48. 
38  Such agreements could only be expected in smaller markets where the number of competitors 
could make this conduct feasible. 
39  Competition Code, s45. 
40  Competition Code, s45(2)(a)(i).  
41  Competition Code, s45(2)(a)(ii). 
42  Competition Code, s45A. 
43  Ie, price fixing is a breach that necessarily leads to strict liability. 
44  See Byrne and Mortensen, above n 2, 263-4. 
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specifically about securing access to conveyancing markets for nonlawyer 
conveyancers.45 It did not raise any question of market definition or of competition 
within markets per se. Treating the two Sande series as irrelevant to this question,46 we 
therefore believe that some significance can be given to the empirical observation that, in 
the 15 years since the application of the Competition Code, there has not been a single 
action involving Queensland solicitors for anti-competitive conduct relevant to 
conveyancing. 
 
B   Competition Policy 
 
Competition law rests on supporting competition for the benefit of consumers, and 
not of competitors47 – the different angle of the Sande litigation that we discussed in the 
first article.48 If the relevant markets are already competitive and the existing participants 
are effectively controlled (in respect of specific anti-competitive conduct) by the 
Competition Code, it is possible to argue that the status quo can be defended. However, 
all States and Territories did agree that, in implementing the Code, there would be a 
review of any legislation that imposed restrictions on competition. So the further question 
to be explored is whether the conveyancing reservation can be defended, as a matter of 
policy, regardless of any existing evidence of strong competition. 
As was noted in the first article, 49  the National Competition Council and the 
Queensland Government presently disagree as to whether there is any need to reserve 
conveyancing work exclusively for solicitors. The significance of this disagreement lies 
in the Inter-Governmental Competition Principles Agreement made in 1995, which 
requires the review of any legislation that may have the effect of restricting competition. 
Specifically, this agreement is that ‘legislation ... should not restrict competition unless it 
can be demonstrated that: (a) the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole 
outweigh the costs; and (b) the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by 
restricting competition.’50 A transparent and accountable review process was needed to 
ensure that the interests of the public were of paramount concern, and that the influence 
of vested interest groups (like, in relation to the conveyancing reservation, the AIC and 
the Queensland Law Society) be minimised.51 In the course of this review, it has been 
accepted that exemptions from competition principles are often appropriate for 
professionals. 52  However, the Queensland conveyancing reservation has been more 
exposed to criticism than any other aspect of the legal practice reservation across 
Australia because nonlawyer conveyancers are allowed in other States and the Northern 
Territory.53 
 
                                                 
45  Ibid. 
46  Likewise similar proceedings in the period involving nonlawyer conveyancing: Re Wood 
[1996] 1 Qd R 688 (mutual recognition) and Queensland Law Society Inc v Hoy [1995] QSC 
169 (legal practice reservation). 
47  Corones, above n 10, 34, referring to Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty 
Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 191, 194, 213; Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty 
Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 13; Boral Besser Masonary Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374, 
411; Universal Music Australia v ACCC (2003) 131 FCR 529, 585; Baxter Healthcare Pty 
Ltd v ACCC [2005] ATPR 42-066. 
48  Byrne and Mortensen, above n 2, 263-4. 
49  Ibid 254. 
50  Cl 5 Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth) – Inter-Governmental Agreements. 
51  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Promoting Competition and Fair 
Trading (2004) 10-11. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid. 
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1   The Review of the Queensland Conveyancing Reservation  
 
Legislation affecting legal practice in Queensland has been the subject of ongoing 
reviews by the Queensland Government and by the National Competition Council. In its 
2005 Annual Review, the Council recognised significant progress by Queensland in 
removing key restrictions on competition applicable to the legal profession (including the 
introduction of ILPs),54 but concluded that the reform process was not complete.55 Its 
assessment was that the Government had not complied with its obligations under the 
Competition Principles Agreement by continuing to maintain the conveyancing 
reservation for solicitors.56 Ironically, this assessment was made just after the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) completed the process of removing barristers as a group 
entitled to undertake conveyancing.57  
Earlier, in 2003, the Queensland Government considered the conveyancing 
reservation in a competition impact statement.58 A key conclusion made in the impact 
statement was that:59 
 
…a full law degree is not necessary to the achievement of the objective of the legal 
practice legislation with respect to conveyancing. If persons are able to meet standards 
of knowledge and practical training, allowing them to competently perform 
conveyancing services and have adequate professional indemnity and fidelity insurance, 
they should be permitted to compete in the market for conveyancing work. 
 
Despite this conclusion, the Government decided to maintain the reservation and 
advised the Council of its reasons. These were:60 
 
• The market for conveyancing services was already competitive and allowing 
nonlawyers into the market will not necessarily result in lower fees. 
• The costs of establishing a scheme to license nonlawyer conveyancers was not 
justified. 
• Nonlawyer conveyancers may not be supported by appropriate insurance and may 
be vulnerable to market failure. 
• Conveyancers in other jurisdictions may only offer limited services or were not 
legislatively recognised. 
 
It is interesting that the Council accepted that conveyancing markets in Queensland 
were highly competitive,61 and that lowering barriers to enter them might therefore be of 
little or no benefit to consumers. However, the Council was more concerned to apply the 
State’s obligations under the Competition Principles Agreement which, effectively, 
presume that competition restrictions like a barrier to entry should be removed. They can 
only be justified if shown to be in the public interest. Here the onus rested on the 
Queensland Government, and the Council thought it had not shown that the 
                                                 
54  Other reforms included removing separate admission requirements for solicitors and 
barristers and allowing interstate lawyers to practise without a local practising certificate: R 
Mortensen, ‘Becoming a Lawyer: From Admission to Practice under the Legal Profession 
Act 2004 (Qld)’ (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 319. 
55  National Competition Council, above n 31, 13.7. 
56  Ibid 13.9. 
57  Byrne and Mortensen, above n 2, 262. 
58  National Competition Policy Review, above n 30, 13.7. 
59  Ibid 10. 
60  National Competition Council, above n 31, 13.8. 
61  Ibid 13.8. 
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conveyancing reservation was in the public interest.62 The Council agreed that, given 
existing competition, the introduction of nonlawyer conveyancing might not result in 
lower fees, but there was no evidence to indicate that lower fees would not result. 
Similarly, while the regulation of nonlawyer conveyancers would attract costs, the 
Government had not shown that those costs would outweigh any benefits to consumers 
that might result. The Queensland Government had also not proved its concerns about 
insurance for, and the potential failure of, nonlawyer conveyancers. It had also not shown 
how these risks could be minimised. Finally, the Council denied that it had singled out 
Queensland on this issue; it did not consider that limitations on nonlawyer conveyancing 
in other States were appropriate.63 
 
2   Other Issues for Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 
The central issue for the Queensland conveyancing reservation under the 
Competition Principles Agreement is not whether (as under the competition law) the 
reservation leads to individual solicitors’ practices exercising a substantial degree of 
power in conveyancing markets, but whether it positively benefits the public and, if so, 
how those benefits outweigh the costs of maintaining the reservation. The State 
Government offered its four reasons for maintaining the reservation but, as we have 
noted before,64 these reasons have shifted over time. A closer analysis of the arguments 
that have been developed on these issues allows us to revisit some that have been 
mustered in the past. 
 
(a)   Qualifications Skill and Expertise of the Service Provider 
 
A concern expressed in an earlier competition review of the reservation is that 
lowering the barrier to entering conveyancing markets in Queensland will lead to 
residential conveyancing services being offered by two different types of suppliers, who 
may be seen as comparable by consumers even though they may have considerably 
different levels of expertise. Solicitors arguably bring to the service a higher level of skill 
and training. They are subject to strong professional controls and ethical standards. And 
although residential conveyances may be generally seen as routine, there is significant 
potential for the transaction to raise more complicated legal problems.65  Nonlawyer 
conveyancers, on the other hand, are considerably less qualified and do not have the 
range of expertise needed to deal with all potential problems that a land transaction can 
involve. Their ability and professional standards could not be easily compared. The 
argument is not just that the suppliers may be of differing quality, but that consumers 
may not be able to assess that from information available in the market. The argument is 
that this creates the problem of information asymmetry:66 consumers have a limited 
capacity to make informed choices about the provider who will serve them best.67 It is 
                                                 
62  Ibid 13.8. 
63  Ibid 13.9. 
64  Byrne and Mortensen, above n 2, 254. 
65  For a summary of these arguments refer National Competition Policy Legislation Review, 
Legal Profession Act 1993 Regulatory Impact Statement April 2001 (2001) 22. 
66  For a discussion of the development of the economic principles that support this, see 
Spigelman, above n 6.  
67  For a discussion of the consequences of consumers lacking the information to make optimal 
purchasing decisions, see E Miller, WD Duncan, SA Christensen, SG Corones, D Round, M 
Burdon and AP Stickley, ‘Is Mandatory Disclosure an Effective Consumer Protection 
Mechanism in Australian Real Estate Markets? The Perspective of Queensland Industry 
Experts’ (Paper presented at the Proceedings Social Change in the 21st Century Conference, 
Brisbane, 2006) 4.  
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said that information asymmetry led to the original need to regulate standards of 
accreditation and the use of professional titles. Consumers could then rely with some 
confidence on that professional standing.68 
 
(b)   The Duties Owed to Clients 
 
The question of the standard of care owed by nonlawyer conveyancers to their 
clients appears to have been first raised in Benson v MacLachlan.69 Although only in an 
obiter dictum, Meagher JA believed that the Conveyancers Licensing Act 1995 (NSW) 
allowed nonlawyer conveyancers ‘to do any conveyancing work, not simply easy 
conveyancing work [and] they are now placed on equal standing with solicitors in that 
area of legal practice, and they ought to have the same liability’.70 In contrast, Handley 
JA distinguished the roles of solicitors and nonlawyer conveyancers by their 
qualifications.71  
 
Licensed conveyancers are not qualified for admission as legal practitioners and are not 
entitled to hold themselves out as so qualified. They do not have law degrees and the 
public know or should know these basic facts. They are capable of doing conveyancing 
work which does not require the fuller legal knowledge which solicitors are expected to 
possess. They can and do provide a basic service at a basic cost. They should not be 
expected either by their clients, or by the courts, to provide a champagne service for 
what amounts to a beer price. 
 
Handley JA’s assumption that there are price differences between the conveyancing 
services offered by solicitors and conveyancers is questionable. However, the possibility 
that different standards of care could be expected of solicitors and conveyancers is the 
principal cause for concern about Handley JA’s judgment in Benson. This naturally 
means consumers’ – clients’ – rights are contingent on who provides the service, and 
who is negligent. Still, it would also be a consideration that is likely to create greater 
information asymmetries in conveyancing markets, as it is unlikely that consumers would 
know of different standards of care and even less likely that either solicitors or nonlawyer 
conveyancers would advertise them.  
 
(c)   Insurance, Risks of Failure, Costs of Licensing 
 
To have access to the same markets as solicitors, it would be expected that 
nonlawyer conveyancers should offer the same protections for consumers through 
appropriate insurance and a fidelity fund. This may possibly have been achieved in other 
States, though not without considerable anguish along the way. 
In 2004, the Queensland Government still maintained disquiet about the ability of 
nonlawyer conveyancers (as a group) to obtain appropriate insurances, and the potential 
losses to be incurred from public funds in the case of failures.72 While these concerns 
may be alleviated by appropriate licensing schemes that incorporate requirements for 
insurance and levies for fidelity funds, the cost of those schemes for a small occupational 
group is possibly significant when weighed against any likely consumer benefits from the 
increased competition. 
                                                 
68  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Competition Committee, Policy 
Roundtables Competition in Professional Services 1999 (1999) 104. 
69  [2001] NSWCA 263. 
70  Ibid [20]. 
71  Ibid [24]. For further analysis of this decision, see P Morgan, ‘Conveyancing Choice, 
Regulation diverges with new Conveyancers Act’ (2003) 41 Law Society Journal 51. 
72  National Competition Council, above n 31, 13.8. 
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The particular concerns experienced in other States when regulating nonlawyer 
conveyancers include minimum educational requirements, and the potential for actions 
based on incompetence or fraud. The question of educational requirements received 
considerable attention in 2007, when the New South Wales Office of Fair Trading 
reviewed the qualifications required for conveyancers under the Conveyancing Licensing 
Act 2003.73 The NSW Government wanted to ensure that licensing meant that nonlawyer 
conveyancers were accountable and met minimum standards of competence. Attention 
was drawn to possible points of risk for consumers when dealing with a conveyancer, 
specifically to identify what should be the prescribed competencies for licensing. In 
doing so, it highlighted the problem of information asymmetry discussed earlier,74 in the 
public being able to assess the conveyancer’s competence on the basis of information 
available in the market.75 
 
For many people, buying or selling property may only occur once or twice in their 
lifetime and so they may find it difficult to assess whether a conveyancer has the level of 
competence to efficiently represent their interests. 
 
The identified risks arose from the fiduciary relationship with clients, the potential 
for poor quality service and, again, information asymmetry.76 They included risks of 
fraud and incompetence. The need to avoid these demanded that the necessary 
protections be thoroughly mapped against the qualifications to be required of nonlawyer 
conveyancers, and inevitably a raising of educational standards. Presumably the cost of 
implementing such measures in Queensland, with its own jurisdictional peculiarities, 
would be considerable. However, the issue should have already been considered when 
dealing with the qualifications of real estate agents who, as we discussed in the first 
article, are allowed to perform significant aspects of what the law regards as 
conveyancing work.77  
In Victoria the need for comprehensive licensing requirements was highlighted by 
the collapse of Grove Conveyancing Services in 2004.78 This identified for the Victorian 
Government the need for closer regulation of nonlawyer conveyancers to protect 
consumers. A report delivered to the Government in 2005 raised again questions of 
consumer protection that relate to information asymmetries as well as identifying the 
potential for the transactions to cause significant harm to third parties.79  
In particular consumers may find themselves at an information disadvantage when 
purchasing conveyancing services because such services may be: 
 
• hard to inspect before they are purchased; 
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• hard to assess even after purchase due to their complexity and the 
requirement for a judgement on the quality of those services; 
• hard to check because services tend to be bought infrequently and therefore 
they are not easily compared with quality of previous purchases; and/or 
• relate to a high value purchase so mistakes may cause serious and 
potentially irreversible harm.80 
 
... the failure of a conveyancer may create a series of ripple effects as innocent 
third parties are affected because of the loss of money, delays in transfer 
settlement, and so on. The magnitude of the funds involved in conveyancing 
means that costs for third parties can be large even with only a few problem 
conveyances.81 
 
After the introduction of the Conveyancers Act 2006 (Vic) to license and better 
regulate conveyancers, a Regulatory Impact Statement was also prepared.82 It was still 
concerned about the need to protect consumers against the risks highlighted in the earlier 
report. It suggested that unforeseen costs of adequate protection for consumers of 
conveyancing services could potentially increase. Problems associated with 
conveyancing have a long lead time, and the fear was that there has been insufficient time 
for some problems to surface. There were also ongoing questions whether the legislation 
appropriately dealt with the qualifications of conveyancers, and the adequacy and process 
of obtaining professional indemnity insurance.83 Indeed, the AIC predicted that efforts to 
improve the qualifications of nonlawyer conveyancers in Victoria and ‘clean up’ 
relationships with real estate agents would see some leave the industry,84 suggesting that 
barriers to entry were initially lowered too far. The complexity of the licensing regime 
and ongoing concerns about potential risks for consumers add weight to the argument in 
Queensland about the costs associated with establishing the scheme.  
 
(d)   Bush Lawyers  
 
Although in the 1870s the Douglas Government was suggesting that, if nonlawyer 
conveyancers were needed anywhere in Queensland, it was in ‘the interior’,85 since that 
time there have been persistent concerns about the impact increased competition may 
have on the viability of regional solicitors’ practices. The argument relies on the 
assumption that revenue from conveyancing practice in the regions cross-subsidises other 
aspects of legal practice; in particular, family law and litigation. If, of course, nonlawyer 
conveyancing made regional practice less viable, then in a given conveyancing market 
consumers could be deprived of other legal services. In the first article, we outlined the 
representations that regional solicitors have regularly made to prosecute for illegal 
conveyancing.86 More recently, two Queensland Law Society Presidents continued this 
argument. In 2002, Joe Tooma said ‘diluting the conveyancing market with private 
practitioners would impact on the viability of some law firms, especially in the bush. We 
do not want to see rural areas lose their legal services.’87 In 2003, Glenn Ferguson, made 
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the claim that ‘conveyancing was the backbone of the practice of many regional 
solicitors’ and that most ‘of the solicitors in regional centres are generally the only 
solicitor in that town’.88 
It has been argued in Queensland’s own competition policy review that it is more 
likely regional solicitors would have little to worry about. It claimed nonlawyer 
conveyancers would not operate in such areas simply because they would need a larger 
base of clientele to support a business that just provided conveyancing services. This has 
certainly been the claim of the conveyancers themselves.89 Related to this, solicitors’ 
practices have greater service differentiation and more diverse revenue sources and, as a 
result, any loss of work in one area should not impact as significantly on the availability 
of legal services generally. This naturally undermines arguments about the extent to 
which conveyancing revenue cross-subsidises other legal services. Finally, existing 
solicitors are well placed to compete with nonlawyer conveyancers and to market their 
existing goodwill and higher qualifications.90  
This is one consideration that we believe should now be disregarded, or weighed as 
insignificant. The Law Society has raised no empirical evidence to support the Tooma 
and Ferguson claims and, if anything, the evidence that is now available suggests that the 
advent of nonlawyer conveyancing has not led to poorer legal service provision in the 
regions than is currently available in Queensland. In research related to this article, 
McDougall and Mortensen have analysed the distribution of solicitors’ practices across 
NSW (where nonlawyer conveyancing is lawful) and Queensland (where it is not). The 
evidence clearly establishes that access to legal services – both solicitors’ practices and 
solicitors – is better in NSW than it is in Queensland, and that the higher density of 
practices in NSW holds consistently for metropolitan, regional and remote areas.91 Here, 
it is naturally impossible to establish the specific effect that the conveyancing reservation 
has on this distribution, but it can be said that the legalising of nonlawyer conveyancing 
in NSW in 1993 has not led to a poorer distribution of solicitors’ practices in that State. 
In general, it seems best that the Law Society abandon this argument.92  
 
(e)    Professional Fees 
 
It has previously been claimed that ‘conveyancing fees in Queensland are already as 
low, or lower, than anywhere else in Australia because of existing competition’. 93 
However, it is difficult also to maintain the ‘fees’ argument when evidence from other 
jurisdictions is mustered. For example, it has been claimed that when nonlawyer 
conveyancing was revived in NSW in 1993, the average price of a conveyance fell by 17 
per cent over two years.94 Perhaps the more interesting question would be whether this is 
a shorter term phenomenon. Studies on the deregulation of conveyancing in England and 
Wales between 1985 and 1992 would suggest it could be.95 In the year before the first 
nonlawyer conveyancers (re)joined the English and Welsh conveyancing markets, 
solicitors were reportedly reducing fees in anticipation of the new competition. Three 
years later, solicitors’ fees in areas where there were nonlawyer conveyancers were lower 
than those of solicitors in other areas. However, six years later, both the fees of solicitors 
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and nonlawyer conveyancers had risen by more than those in markets with no licensed 
conveyancers. Also, the fees of conveyancers were closer to those of solicitors than had 
been the case before. Accordingly, the threat of lowering barriers to entry into 
conveyancing markets probably had a greater effect on fees than the actual entry of 
nonlawyer conveyancers to these markets. There is therefore some suggestion that 
conveyancers provide a more limited service than solicitors but, unsurprisingly, still have 
the same interest as solicitors in maximising fees. ‘These results should caution against 
the assumption that multiple professional bodies will necessarily be to the benefit of 
consumers’.96 
 
C   Ramalca Revived: Incorporated Legal Practices 
 
The arguments of competition law and policy that have been made in relation to the 
Queensland solicitors’ conveyancing reservation may need some repositioning in light of 
competition-based reforms that have already been made to the profession. Specifically, 
the introduction of ILPs with the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) brought significant 
changes to the lawful management, practice and capital financing arrangements of 
solicitors’ business structures that, perhaps, have had unforeseen effects on the possible 
access of nonlawyers to conveyancing markets. In the first article, we discussed how 
some corporate structures that blended lawyer and nonlawyer practices were held to be 
unlawful in Law Society of NSW v Ramalca Pty Ltd.97 ILPs now legalise some Ramalca-
style arrangements.  
The Legal Profession Act, adopting the Model Laws, allows a solicitor to 
incorporate a practice, whether conducted alone or with other solicitors. In addition, it 
also allows any corporation to undertake legal practice so long as it meets two 
requirements of solicitor involvement in its management and the supervision of legal 
work. First, the corporation needs at least one legal practitioner director,98 who must be 
an ‘Australian legal practitioner’ holding a principal’s practising certificate. 99  In 
Queensland, this means the director must be entitled to practise as a principal solicitor.100 
Secondly, the solicitor-director must ensure that the corporation has ‘appropriate 
management systems’ that enable it to provide legal services in accordance with 
solicitors’ usual professional obligations.101 This duty also requires the solicitor-director 
to take reasonable action to make sure breaches of professional obligations do not happen 
or, if they do happen, to take ‘appropriate remedial action’. 102  No other special 
requirements exist for an ILP, except that, in addition to the usual regulation of 
corporations conducted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, they 
remain under the regulation of the Queensland Law Society and the Legal Services 
Commissioner. Indeed, the Law Society and the Commissioner have powers to audit 
ILPs that they do not have for unincorporated practices.103 
The result is that the ILP is a business structure for lawyers that is radically different 
from the traditional partnership. An ILP is not restricted to undertaking only legal 
practice – it can also conduct businesses that do not amount to providing legal 
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services.104 Where in a partnership the owners have fiduciary duties that restrict the 
extent to which they can abdicate managerial responsibilities for the practice, there is no 
requirement for an ILP that a shareholder be a director or that a solicitor-director be a 
shareholder. The other directors need not be lawyers, let alone have a principal’s 
practising certificate. It is quite possible that all of the directors of an ILP (but one) might 
not have any legal qualifications.105 And, there is no requirement whatsoever that the ILP 
be owned, even in part, by a lawyer. All of the owners of any unincorporated law practice 
– whether it is sole trading or a partnership – must hold principals’ certificates, and they 
are still banned from ‘sharing receipts’ with anyone who does not hold a principal’s 
certificate.106 In fact, a number of solicitors in Queensland have been disciplined for 
sharing conveyancing profits with nonlawyer conveyancers. In Adamson v Queensland 
Law Society,107 a solicitor suffered a year’s suspension from practice for sharing a fixed 
75 per cent of professional fees with his conveyancing clerk (who actually worked out of 
separate premises). The arrangements were a little more elaborate in Legal Services 
Commissioner v McClelland,108 where the solicitor was suspended from practice for four 
months. He had arranged with a nonlawyer conveyancer (and her company) that she 
would organise buyers to sign contracts and assist them in securing finance, and would 
then refer them to the solicitor for the conveyancing.109 For each transaction, the solicitor 
charged $2,500 but remitted a fixed $1,000 to the conveyancer.110 The idea of the ban on 
sharing receipts is that all profits of the practice should belong, at least in the first 
instance, to solicitors with principals’ certificates. For an ILP, all profits of the practice 
might belong to no one who is a lawyer. As an entity, it also falls outside the ban on 
sharing receipts that applies to unincorporated practices.111 Therefore, if a solicitor were 
to incorporate his practice, it is possible that the resulting ILP could properly share profits 
with a clerk or nonlawyer conveyancer under referral or outsourcing arrangements 
similar to those disciplined in Adamson or McClelland.112 
So, in traditional unincorporated legal practice, reserved ‘legal practice’ is supposed 
only to be managed by and make profits for principal solicitors, and to be exclusive of 
other kinds of business. For ILPs, legal practice is more porous, and may be largely 
managed by and run for the benefit of people who are not lawyers. So far as accessing 
Queensland conveyancing markets is concerned, it took about a year for interstate 
nonlawyer conveyancers to use the ILP. At least one interstate conveyancer opened 
business in Brisbane through an ILP (with a solicitor as a director) in 2008.113 There may 
now be more, especially on the Gold Coast.114 The AIC saw the ILP as an opportunity for 
nonlawyer conveyancers to gain access to Queensland markets, but as a ‘transitionary 
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phase’ in its efforts to establish a licensing system that did not involve lawyers.115 The 
regulators also recognised that the ILP gave new opportunities for nonlawyer 
conveyancers to be involved in conveyancing work in Queensland, but naturally under a 
principal solicitor’s supervision. Legal Services Commissioner John Briton said that ‘an 
incorporated legal practice that does conveyancing is no different to a partnership that 
employs conveyancers who are not legally trained.’ ‘That is quite proper so long as they 
are supervised or the lawyer is doing the component of conveyancing that counts as legal 
work.’116 
The ILP therefore demands some rethinking of the lawful arrangements for 
conveyancing in Queensland. The arrangements that were punished in Ramalca – a 
lawyer doing the conveyancing, working within the company’s business structure, using 
its secretarial resources and paid a salary – are now allowed. The only continuing 
restrictions are that the lawyer is a properly certified solicitor (and not, as in Ramalca 
itself, a barrister), is made a director of the corporation, and takes any supervision of 
legally unqualified staff seriously.117 As we have noted, the traditional barriers to gaining 
access to the profits of legal practice have now disappeared, and this suggests some 
rethinking of the competition issues canvassed by the National Competition Council in 
2005. Strangely, ILPs may have made the AIC’s particular case for access to Queensland 
conveyancing markets even harder to argue.  
 
 
III   CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of competition law is for courts to determine whether a given market is 
competitive, and whether the conduct of market participants has a detrimental effect on 
competition. It is not necessarily to change the prevailing market structure. Existing 
monopolies, oligopolies or barriers to entry are not to be unthinkingly dismantled. Quite 
simply, the law sensibly just restricts the behaviour of those who do business in those 
conditions. Solicitors in Queensland already operate in a competitive market. They are 
subject to the Competition Code (which applies all the anti-competitive restrictions to 
their business) and, to date, there have been no prosecutions against solicitors for 
violating that Code. From the legal perspective, therefore, maintaining the existing (and 
significantly qualified) ‘legal practice’ barriers to entering conveyancing markets may be 
defensible. 
From the perspective of competition policy, however, the position is more difficult. 
There is little, if nothing, to suggest that lowering the barrier to entry will improve the 
quality and efficiency of conveyancing services for consumers. The question largely 
seems to be one of whether to benefit a group of potential suppliers: nonlawyer 
conveyancers. In other words, the purpose of the AIC’s efforts to change legal barriers to 
entering Queensland conveyancing markets is precisely the same as the limited focus of 
the Sande litigation. Regardless of any improvement for consumers, should nonlawyer 
conveyancers be allowed to profit by different terms of access to Queensland 
conveyancing markets? 
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A   Mutual Recognition  
 
The AIC’s efforts at securing access to Queensland markets have tended to 
concentrate on arguments based on the principle of the mutual recognition of occupations 
across Australia. However, the Mutual Recognition Act itself has been of no assistance. 
In the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court Act 1867 and its references to certificated 
conveyancers were still on the Queensland statute book, but so was the Legal 
Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1938’s ban on admitting conveyancers after 1 January 
1940.118 As a result, in the Sande 1A case119 Fryberg J held that the provisions of the Act 
of 1938 ‘severely restrict the operation of the 1867 Act’, and that they ended the 
occupation of conveyancer in Queensland.120  Therefore, although Sande was a land 
broker in South Australia, there was no occupation of conveyancer in Queensland that 
could be regarded as equivalent to land broking. 121  And even if court-licensed 
conveyancers still existed in Queensland, it was a profession that lawfully conducted 
more kinds of legal work than the South Australian land brokers’ profession did. They 
could not be regarded as equivalents.122 Likewise in Sande 1B123 in the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal, Mathews J held that the occupation of conveyancer had ceased to exist 
by the time the Mutual Recognition Act was passed.124 In the appeal to the Full Court of 
the Federal Court – Sande 1D125 – Lockhart J agreed with Sande that the office of 
conveyancer had not been abolished in Queensland, but that the effect of the Act of 1938 
was that it was ‘practically unreal’ to regard anyone as now qualifying for admission to 
that profession in Queensland.126 This put an end to any genuine attempt by individual 
conveyancers to gain access to Queensland markets under the Mutual Recognition Act, 
although Sande 2A127 shows that Sande himself continued to resort to the Act. It also 
shows that he was too prepared to overwork its language, and was punished for doing 
so.128  
The AIC has nevertheless continued to press the mutual recognition principle for 
lowering the barrier to entry, and in some respects still denies the effect of the Sande 1 
litigation. In 2008, it argued in a submission to the Productivity Commission on mutual 
recognition schemes that it was ‘erroneous’ to claim that the occupation of conveyancer 
did not exist in Queensland. There were nonlawyer conveyancers working in Queensland 
solicitors’ practices; they just could not work outside them.129 Perhaps reflecting the 
AIC’s origins, it appealed especially to the experience of nonlawyer conveyancing in 
South Australia and suggested that, if interstate conveyancers were recognised in 
Queensland, they would give conveyancing markets ‘much needed competition’, and 
result in ‘very significant benefits to the consumer’. It claimed that the current 
arrangements in Queensland led to a ‘denial of public benefit’ and ‘reduced 
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productivity’.130 However, these submissions lacked any empirical support for the AIC’s 
claims of competition and benefit and, indeed, did not even suggest what those benefits 
might be. Significantly, in relation to the Queensland reservation it made no suggestion 
as to how the Mutual Recognition Act should be changed so as to enable nonlawyer 
conveyancers to offer their services in Queensland. This is understandable, as it is 
difficult to see how continuing to pursue mutual recognition solutions without, in the 
Legal Profession Act, making a second exception to the Queensland conveyancing 
reservation can assist the AIC. 131  As Lockhart J noted in Sande 1D, the Mutual 
Recognition Act ‘preserves the right of the State … to regulate the manner of carrying on 
an occupation in that State’.132 Spender J added that it would be ‘farcical’ to try to solve 
the AIC’s problem of access by any means other than a change to Queensland’s own 
laws; otherwise the only nonlawyers allowed to conduct conveyancing in Queensland 
would be ‘non-Queenslanders’.133 
 
B   Costs and Benefits 
 
The principal interest that both the Queensland Law Society and the AIC have in 
the debate over the (qualified) reservation in Queensland of conveyancing for lawyers is 
the profit of their members. That is how it should be. But any assessment of the value of 
the reservation for the public is to be made from a different perspective, and with the 
interests of a professional or industry association appropriately discounted. However, the 
account given earlier of the development of the conveyancing reservation, and its 
analysis in light of competition law, policy and reforms already made, suggest more 
concentrated lines of debate for any future reconsideration of the reservation.  
To begin with, there are arguments that the Law Society is best to abandon, or that 
it should be reluctant to make. At present, the ‘bush lawyers’ argument cannot be 
sustained. There is no evidence to support it, and what evidence that is available 
suggests, to the contrary, that nonlawyer conveyancing has not necessarily led to poorer 
access to regional solicitors’ services than Queensland has at present.134 Further, although 
the qualifications of nonlawyer conveyancers are certainly an important consideration, 
the Law Society itself cannot credibly argue that lawyers alone meet the necessary 
standards of education and training when, for so long, it effectively nullified important 
aspects of the conveyancing reservation by endorsing real estate agents’ dominant role in 
the very creation of residential land sale contracts. The Government, likewise, has tacitly 
recognised this by regularising the agents’ exception to the reservation in the Legal 
Profession Acts.135 Equally, although in 2008 the AIC was at pains to reinforce that there 
be ‘no lowering of educational requirements and other standards for Conveyancers to 
operate’,136 it has still not developed national standards of education and training for 
nonlawyer conveyancers and, before 2005, had by all accounts been prepared to allow 
the barrier to entering Victorian conveyancing markets to be lowered below the point 
where the public was adequately protected.137  
Any reconsideration of the conveyancing reservation therefore, we suggest, should 
concentrate on three issues. First, the expertise required to conduct a conveyance should 
not be exaggerated. Arguments about the necessity of a lawyer’s qualifications and 
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expertise have little credit when nonlawyer conveyancing is allowed in all other States 
and the Northern Territory and, for the most part, without serious industry-wide problems 
of expertise. However, the likelihood of different qualifications must also overcome the 
effect that information asymmetries can have on consumers. It would be unacceptable if 
the presumably lower educational and training standards of nonlawyer conveyancers 
were to allow a lower standard of care,138 poorer insurance or fidelity coverage, or 
weaker regulatory or disciplinary supervision.139 This leads to the second, and most 
important, consideration: the costs of a regulated, nonlawyer conveyancing scheme, as 
compared with the benefits. It seems doubtful, given the National Competition Council’s 
agreement in 2005 that Queensland conveyancing markets were already competitive,140 
that any benefits of nonlawyer access will be significant. Accordingly, the costs of any 
regulatory scheme for nonlawyer conveyancers must be minimal if lowering the barrier 
to entry is to be worthwhile. The experience in other States has shown that it is difficult 
(and presumably costly) to provide the necessary regulation for nonlawyer conveyancers. 
The AIC is therefore best to concentrate its efforts on securing protections and assurances 
equivalent to those that solicitors now give, but with minimal additional cost. And 
thirdly, the effect that ILPs have on this debate must be seriously weighed. The question 
now before the National Competition Council is not what benefits consumers; it is what 
secures benefits to nonlawyer conveyancers. However, ILPs already give them the right 
to draw profits from conveyancing services in relation to land in Queensland. The 
marginal cost, which imports all of the protections that are available for solicitors’ 
conveyancing under the Legal Profession Act, is engaging a properly certified solicitor as 
a director. 141  Furthermore, it is possible that the cost of a solicitor-director in a 
nonlawyer-controlled ILP is the minimum that is required to secure the most effective 
regulation of nonlawyer conveyancing services. It is even possible that this may be a 
more efficient and protective arrangement than the schemes currently in place for 
nonlawyer conveyancers in other States and the Northern Territory. It is a solution that is 
untidy, and one that many in the conveyancing industry do not want.142 To this point, the 
contest between solicitors and conveyancers in Queensland has been one of mutual 
exclusion. Solicitors have maintained that nonlawyer conveyancers should be excluded 
from the State, and conveyancers want a scheme for doing business exclusively of 
solicitors. It may just be that the most protective cost-efficient arrangement requires 
them, through an ILP, to work together. When there were plans in 1930 to abandon 
certificated conveyancers in NSW,143 the Sydney Morning Herald complained that just 
‘the solicitors remain’.144 The conclusion can only be tentative, but it might be that for 
Queensland in the 2000s this is still the best outcome. 
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